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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
Thomas Howerter appeals his conviction for bank lar ceny 
under 18 U.S.C. S 2113(b). The District Court determined 
that the elements required by the statute had been 
satisfied. On appeal, Howerter contends that his conduct is 
not proscribed by the federal bank larceny statute. We 
agree, and we will REVERSE.1 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
From 1994 to 1997, while living in Germany, Howerter 
was the treasurer of the Wuerzbur g American High School 
Parent Teacher Student Association ("PTSA"), a private 
organization located in West Ger many that collected private 
donations and issued scholarship checks to the children of 
Army employees to help defray the cost of college tuition. 
As treasurer, Howerter was r esponsible for collecting 
donations, depositing them in a bank account, and writing 
checks to the colleges and universities in the name of the 
student recipients, all on behalf of PTSA. 
 
On September 22, 1994, PTSA opened a bank account at 
Community Bank, a division of Nations Bank, which is 
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
("FDIC"). Howerter signed the signatur e card as custodian, 
which authorized the bank to honor his signatur e for the 
payment of funds and the transaction of business on the 
account. In 1996 and 1997, Howerter betrayed the trust 
placed in him, withdrawing $18,000 from the account by 
writing checks on the account payable to himself, signing 
the checks as drawer, endorsing them, and then keeping 
the money for himself, instead of using it for PTSA's 
purposes. On January 20, 1996, Howerter also withdr ew 
$525 in cash from the account by the use of a withdrawal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Howerter also urged that the statute was unconstitutional as applied 
to him; the District Court rejected this ar gument. We do not reach this 
issue because we reverse based on the scope of the statute itself. 
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slip. He cashed fifteen of the seventeen checks at the same 
branch of Nations Bank in Kitzingen, Germany, and the 
same teller handled all of these transactions. Some of the 
checks bore memo notations, such as "senior class party," 
and "scholarship." Although Nations Bank suf fered no loss 
as a result of Howerter's conduct, PTSA clearly did. 
 
In March 1999, a grand jury in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania returned a one count indictment charging 
Howerter with bank larceny under 18 U.S.C.S 2113(b). 
Specifically, the indictment charged that fr om June 1, 
1996, to July 31, 1997, Howerter stole $19,025 fr om an 
account in the custody of Nations Bank, an FDIC-insured 
bank. After a non-jury trial, he was convicted, and has 
appealed from the Court's final judgment entered on 
November 5, 1999. 
 
We exercise plenary review over the issue that is the 
basis for our reversal of Howerter's conviction: whether 18 
U.S.C. S 2113(b) was properly applied in the instant case. 
See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(holding that issues of statutory interpretation are subject 
to plenary review). 
 
II. Discussion 
 
On appeal, Howerter challenges his conviction and the 
District Court's denial of his motion for acquittal, urging 
that S 2113(b) has been improperly applied to him because 
his conduct does not fit within the statutory purview. 
 
The bank larceny statute at issue, 18 U.S.C.S 2113(b), 
provides in relevant part: 
 
       Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or 
       purloin, any property or money or any other thing of 
       value exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the car e, 
       custody, control, management, or possession of any 
       bank, credit union, or any savings and loan 
       association, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or 
       imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The jurisdictional element is found in 18 U.S.C. S 2113(f): 
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Howerter frames his argument as follows: 
 
       The scope of the federal bank larceny statute has 
       evolved over many years so as to include lar ceny by 
       false pretenses. However, in every case of larceny by 
       false pretenses, the bank itself was the victim of some 
       fraudulent conduct by the defendant. 
 
       In the present case, Mr. Howerter was authorized to 
       sign checks drawn on the fund's account, and the 
       bank was authorized to cash those checks. As far as 
       the bank was concerned, Mr. Howerter lawfully 
       withdrew the funds pursuant to the terms of the 
       account. No material misrepresentations were made to 
       the bank by Mr. Howerter to induce the r elease of the 
       monies. 
 
       Although Mr. Howerter ultimately kept the money for 
       himself, this is a matter between Mr. Howerter and the 
       scholarship fund, not between Mr. Howerter and the 
       bank. Accordingly, Mr. Howerter did not commit bank 
       larceny within the meaning of the federal bank larceny 
       statute. 
 
App. Br. at 7-8. In response, the gover nment argues that 
withdrawal of money under false pretenses satisfies the 
"taking" element, that the money was clearly in the custody 
and control of the bank, and that "[t]he stipulated facts 
establish that Howerter misrepresented that he was acting 
within his authority by cashing checks when he intended to 
keep, and did keep, the money himself." Appellee Br. at 10- 
11. 
 
The District Court held that the elements of the crime of 
bank larceny had been established beyond a r easonable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       As used in this section the term "bank" means any member bank of 
       the Federal Reserve System, and any bank, banking association, 
       trust company, savings bank, or other banking institution organized 
       or operating under the laws of the United States, including a 
branch 
       of agency of a foreign bank (as such ter ms are defined in 
       paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 1(b) of the Inter national 
Banking 
       Act of 1978), and any institution the deposits of which are insured 
       by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
 
                                4 
  
doubt by the parties' stipulations, and recounted these 
elements as follows: (1) Defendant took or carried away 
more than $100.00 of money in the custody of a bank; (2) 
Defendant did so intentionally, knowing that he was not 
entitled to it; and (3) the bank's deposits wer e insured by 
the FDIC. Dist. Ct. Op. at 2. 
 
As should be readily apparent from the foregoing 
recitation of Howerter's argument, the statutory language, 
and the government's position, the statute could be read to 
cover this situation. But we are not certain that it should 
be. We have not been able to locate a similar , or even 
comparable, fact pattern, and the gover nment concedes 
that the dearth of law on point is due to the fact that Mr. 
Howerter's conduct was subjected to federal pr osecution 
because of the lack of any other prosecutorial agency with 
jurisdiction over him. 
 
We will begin the process of deter mining whether 
Howerter's conviction for bank larceny should stand by 
examining the origins of the statute and the r elevant 
precedent construing it. In 1934, Congr ess first considered 
a bill designed "to provide punishment for certain offenses 
against banks, organized or operating under laws of the 
United States, or any member of the Federal Reserve 
System." S. 2841, 73d Cong. (1934). It made bank robbery 
a federal crime by punishing anyone who "by for ce and 
violence, or by putting in fear, feloniously takes, or . . . 
attempts to take . . . any property or money" from a bank, 
id., and was one of several bills intr oduced by the Attorney 
General, who enclosed a letter expressing concern that 
legislation was needed to curb "organized groups of 
gangsters who . . . move rapidly from the scene of one 
crime of violence to another across State lines," S. Rep. No. 
73-537, at 1 (1934); H.R. Rep. 73-1461, at 2 (1934). This 
bill passed both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate and became law. 78 Cong. Rec. 8768, 8776 (1934). 
 
The law was amended in 1937, when a bill was 
introduced that was "designed to enlar ge the scope of the 
bank robbery statute, enacted in 1934, . . . to include 
larceny and burglary of the banks pr otected by this 
statute." H.R. Rep. No. 75-732, at 1 (1937). Once passed, it 
became a crime for anyone to "take and carry away, with 
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intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any 
other thing of value . . . belonging to . . . any bank." 78 
Cong. Rec. 8776 (1937). There is very little legislative 
history regarding the 1934 bill or its amendment in 1937. 
 
We had occasion to examine the federal bank larceny 
statute in United States v. Pinto, 646 F .2d 833 (3d Cir. 
1981), and a year later in United States v. Simmons, 679 
F.2d 1042 (3d Cir. 1982). In Pinto , a foreign bank of one of 
the defendant's customers remitted $193,511 to the 
defendant, instead of the $193.51 instructed by the 
customer. 646 F.2d at 834. The defendant at first insisted 
he had invoices for the amount received but later 
acknowledged that the amount transmitted had been a 
mistake, and was prosecuted for bank lar ceny. Id. We 
reversed the conviction, holding that one who makes use of 
funds deposited into his account as a result of a unilateral 
mistake of the bank has not engaged in taking funds away 
from the bank in a trespassory way, and, thus, is not guilty 
of bank larceny under 18 U.S.C. S 2113(b).3 Id. at 837. 
 
In Simmons, the defendant was a co-conspirator in an 
elaborate scheme involving the cashing of for ged checks. 
We characterized the issue before us as being "whether 
evidence of a comprehensive scheme to negotiate checks 
bearing forged signatures is encompassed within statutory 
language proscribing `taking and carrying away, with intent 
to steal or purloin property or money belonging to a 
federally insured bank.' " 679 F.2d at 1043 (quoting 18 
U.S.C. S 2113(b)). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Pinto's exact holding has been subjectto different interpretations. We 
understand the opinion to distinguish Pinto's conduct from common law 
larceny due to the lack of a trespassory taking, and also to differentiate 
it from the conduct in other cases wher e the defendant engaged in a 
fraudulent scheme. With respect to the latter distinction, Pinto appears 
to distinguish between a scheme hatched contemporaneously with the 
bank's receipt of funds and before an actual taking, as was the case in 
Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 736-38 (5th Cir. 1965) (stating 
that bank larceny statute can be construed to cover defendant's drawing 
money in cash from his bank account knowing that bank had 
mistakenly inflated amount in account), and one that was conceived 
later, as or after funds were actually withdrawn from the account. We do 
not rely on Pinto, and thus need not assess whether, in light of Bell, the 
reasoning in Pinto would continue to excuse Pinto's conduct today. 
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Defendants urged that their embezzlement or obtaining 
by false pretenses was not encompassed within the term 
"steal or purloin" in the statute. Noting that three other 
circuits had rejected this narrow interpretation, we 
reviewed the legislative process that led to passage of the 
law. Id. at 1046-47. We concluded that the law "was 
directed at least in part to the federal gover nment's 
potential obligation as an insurer to r eimburse various 
financial institutions if they were to become victims of 
offenses covered by S 2113." Id. at 1048. We concluded that 
by using the term "steal or purloin," Congress meant to 
reach conduct beyond the trespassory4 taking of common 
law larceny, and that we should not construe the word 
"steal" as nothing more than larceny, as may have been the 
case at common law. Instead, we adopted the meaning of 
"steal" as interpreted by the Supr eme Court in United 
States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 412 (1957), namely, as 
defined in Black's Law Dictionary, to denote "the criminal 
taking of personal property either by lar ceny, 
embezzlement, or false pretenses." Simmons, 679 F.2d at 
1045. We concluded that the words "steal or purloin" 
encompassed a "scheme whereby forged checks were 
utilized to remove funds from insur ed banks." Id. at 1049. 
 
In Simmons, we downplayed the concer n about the 
expansion of federal jurisdiction in the area of criminal law, 
noting that the Supreme Court in McElr oy v. United States, 
455 U.S. 643 (1982), in interpreting 18 U.S.C.S 2314, had 
found this concern unpersuasive in light of the greater 
concern expressed in the statutory language and the 
congressional purpose regarding the need for the federal 
government to aid states in combating crime in interstate 
commerce. 679 F.2d at 1048. We also remarked: "Certainly, 
when the underlying offense affects federally insured money 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The term "trespassory" means without the owner's consent. See Pinto, 
646 F.2d at 836 n.8 ("[O]ne of the essential elements of "common law 
larceny" is that the taking is by tr espass, that is, without the consent 
of 
the owner."); United States v. Johnson , 575 F.2d 678, 679 (8th Cir. 1978) 
("Common law larceny requires a tr espass in the taking."); Bennett v. 
United States, 399 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir . 1968) ("To consummate the 
offense of larceny there must occur a taking of property which is 
trespassory in nature, `without the consent of the owner.' "). 
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or property, Congress has a legitimate concern in exercising 
its jurisdiction to outlaw conduct such as that found to 
have occurred in this case." Id. at 1049. 
 
We also took pains to distinguish our ruling in Simmons 
from our previous decision in Pinto , where we had found no 
bank larceny: 
 
       The difference between the facts in Pinto and those 
       presented here, where there was an ongoing and 
       comprehensive scheme to withdraw funds fr om a series 
       of banks through forged checks, is appar ent on its 
       face. Moreover, the holding in Pinto  was explicitly 
       limited to the facts before the court at that time. As the 
       court stated, "there was no `taking away of funds from 
       either bank in a trespassory way.' " The court stated 
       that the facts before it were "factually quite different" 
       from those cases where the "bank funds taken and 
       carried away were drawn out of a bank thr ough 
       various fraudulent schemes." 
 
Id. at 837. 
 
In many ways, Simmons presaged the Supr eme Court's 
ruling on this issue the very next year in Bell v. United 
States, 462 U.S. 356 (1983). In Bell, the Supreme Court 
held that the federal crime of bank larceny was not limited 
to common law larceny, and that the statutory language 
was broad enough to include conduct encompassed in the 
crime of taking under false pretenses. Id.  at 361. Bell had 
deposited a stolen check for $10,000 into a newly-opened 
account using his own name but otherwise false 
information. Id. at 357. He had alter ed the endorsement to 
reflect his own new deposit account number . Id. After 
waiting several days, he closed the account and took the 
funds. Id. The Supreme Court had little difficulty 
determining that, while what Bell had done would also be 
chargeable as taking under false pretenses, it nonetheless 
fit within the statutory language for the federal crime of 
bank larceny: "The evidence is clear that he`took and 
carried away, with intent to steal or purloin, [over $10,000 
that was] in the care, custody, contr ol, management or 
possession of ' Dade Federal Savings and Loan." Id. at 361 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. S 2113(b)). The Court r easoned that a 
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reading of the statute so as to limit it to common law 
larceny was not appropriate because, while the concept of 
"takes and carries away" is an element of lar ceny at 
common law, the element "with intent to steal or purloin" 
evidences Congress' intent to go beyond common law 
larceny because this phrase had no established meaning at 
common law.5 Id. at 360. 
 
The courts in both Simmons and Bell focused on, and 
essentially based their interpretation of the statutes on, the 
view that the purpose to be served by a federal statute such 
as this is "to protect banks from those who wished to steal 
banks' assets -- even if they used no force in doing so." Id. 
at 362. The fact that the conduct might fall outside 
common law larceny was of no moment. The Supr eme 
Court in Bell concluded: 
 
       The congressional goal of protecting bank assets is 
       entirely independent of the traditional distinction on 
       which Bell relies. To the extent that a bank needs 
       protection against larceny by trick, it also needs 
       protection from false pretenses. W e cannot believe that 
       Congress wished to limit the scope of the amended 
       Act's coverage, and thus limit its remedial purpose, on 
       the basis of an arcane and artificial distinction more 
       suited to the social conditions of 18th century England 
       than the needs of 20th century America. Such an 
       interpretation would signal a retur n to the 
       "incongruous results" that the 1937 amendment was 
       designed to eliminate. 
 
Id. 
 
We had occasion to construe the statute again, but in a 
different factual setting, in United States v. Goldblatt, 813 
F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1987), again addr essing the reach of 
18 U.S.C. S 2113(b). Goldblatt's son made A TM withdrawals 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Supreme Court did not refer ence the rule of lenity, but relied on 
its view of the legislative history as dictating that the statute was not 
intended to proscribe only common law lar ceny. Bell, 462 U.S. at 361- 
62. In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that a narrower reading was 
consistent with a limited purview of federal criminal legislation where 
the 
intended coverage is not clear. Id. at 363. 
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from his father's bank account while Goldblatt was 
incarcerated. 813 F.2d at 621. When Goldblatt was released 
from jail, he reported to the bank that his ATM card had 
been stolen, and claimed the right to the withdrawn funds. 
Id. His requests were at first denied, but after he swore in 
an affidavit that he could not identify the person depicted 
in the six ATM photographs, the bank reimbursed his 
account for the withdrawn funds. Id. Goldblatt then 
withdrew these funds. Id. Subsequently, the bank learned 
that the man in the photographs was Goldblatt's son, and 
charged Goldblatt with bank larceny. Id. He argued that 
because the bank had authorized him to withdraw the 
funds, he could not be guilty of bank larceny. Id. at 624. 
 
However, the crucial fact in Goldblatt  was that the 
authorization was obtained by way of false pr etenses, that 
is, by Goldblatt misrepresenting to the bank that he did not 
recognize his son in the ATM photographs. Id. at 622. We 
therefore held that because S 2113(b) prohibits a broader 
range of conduct than common law larceny, as we had held 
in Simmons, the "taking and carrying away" element could 
be satisfied by Goldblatt's conduct -- withdrawing funds 
pursuant to a scheme to defraud in order to deprive the 
bank of funds. Id. at 625. 
 
We are called upon in the case befor e us to answer the 
question addressed so many times before: When does the 
withdrawal or "taking" of funds from a federal bank 
constitute federal bank larceny? Or, mor e specifically, does 
the defendant's conduct under the facts of this casefit 
within the activity proscribed by the federal bank larceny 
statute? As we have noted, when faced with this question 
in Simmons and Goldblatt, we answer ed in the affirmative. 
Here, we must draw the line once again, this time 
examining Howerter's conduct in light of the facts of the 
case. Was what Howerter did "taking and carrying away 
with intent to steal or purloin?" We conclude that it was 
not. We find two basic distinguishing facts present here: 
first, the unchallenged fact of Howerter's authority to do 
precisely what he did vis-a-vis the bank -- namely, 
withdraw PTSA's funds; and second, the absence of any 
fraudulent conduct directed at the bank, by way of a 
scheme to deprive it of funds or otherwise. In the cases we 
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discuss above, we found the statute to apply because the 
defendant had obtained money by false pretenses through 
a fraudulent scheme directed at the bank. In each case, we 
found that the defendant's conduct constituted "taking and 
carrying away with intent to steal or purloin," even though 
the traditional attribute of bank larceny, namely a 
"trespassory taking," was not present. See e.g., United 
States v. Martin, 215 F.3d 470 (4th Cir . 2000) (affirming 
bank larceny conviction based on robbery of an armored 
truck); United States v. Sacasas, 381 F .2d 451 (2d Cir. 
1967) (upholding multiple count conviction including bank 
larceny where defendants participated in a bank holdup). 
 
Here, there is no evidence of either tr espassory conduct 
constituting common law larceny, which is clearly covered 
by the statute, or of a fraudulent scheme that would make 
Howerter guilty of obtaining money by false pr etenses, as in 
Bell, Simmons, and Goldblatt. To the contrary, there is no 
allegation of a lack of consent by the bank, and therefore, 
there was no trespassory conduct. And because there was 
no falsity or false pretenses directed at the bank in 
obtaining this consent, Howerter's conduct was not 
fraudulent vis-a-vis the bank. Hence, Howerter's conduct 
neither falls within the traditional purview of this statute, 
that is, common law larceny by way of a tr espassory taking, 
nor within the expanded concept of bank larceny after Bell 
and Simmons, which includes a non-tr espassory taking 
accomplished by way of a fraudulent scheme dir ected at the 
bank. 
 
We, therefore, conclude that Howerter's conduct does not 
fit within the parameters of the statute.6 We note, also, that 
we need not decide the precise contours of the statutory 
provision regarding "taking," but only hold that lacking any 
evidence of trespassory or fraudulent conduct directed at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We also note that this case differs from Simmons and Bell not only 
because of the lack of fraudulent conduct dir ected at the bank, but, 
also, 
due to the fact that there was no loss or potential loss to the bank here. 
As we reference in our discussion above, the case law routinely relies on 
congressional policy to protect banks and their assets as the 
underpinning of this statute. We submit that this bolsters our view that 
the legislature was not trying to combat conduct like Howerter's. 
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the bank, there was no taking from the bank's custody as 
contemplated by the statute. 
 
The District Court may have been misguided by its own 
recitation of the "elements" of the crime of bank larceny.7 It 
never really focused on the phrase that has been 
interpreted repeatedly, as we have noted,"takes and carries 
away, with intent to steal or purloin." It is this phrase, and 
its elucidation in the case law, that leads us to conclude 
that Howerter's conduct does not fall within the confines of 
the criminal conduct that the statute proscribes. 
 
In so holding, we reject the government's argument that 
when Howerter withdrew the funds for his own purposes, 
allegedly knowing he would steal those funds fr om the 
organization, he used false pretenses to obtain the funds 
from the bank. Tempting as it may be to punish private 
embezzlement in this way, were we to include this conduct 
as falling within the concept of obtaining bank funds by 
false pretenses, every misused but otherwise consented to 
withdrawal would be subject to federal prosecution. We 
cannot help but view the language from the case law that 
we have referenced above regar ding congressional policy to 
protect banks to mean that the falsity, embezzlement, or 
fraudulent scheme must have been directed at, or 
implicated, the bank in some way, and not mer ely a third 
party. 
 
We also reject the government's ar gument that the 
notations on the memo portion of the checks wer e deceptive 
and the bank therefore paid the checks under false 
pretenses. There was no evidentiary support offered for the 
proposition that the bank was in any way deceived, or paid 
the checks because of any deception. To the contrary, the 
bank clearly paid the checks because it was obligated to 
honor Howerter's signature. It honored all checks -- with 
and without memo notations -- promptly upon 
presentation. While we will draw inferences in favor of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. As we reference above, the District Court recited three "elements:" (1) 
Defendant took or carried away more than $100.00 of money in the 
custody of a bank; (2) Defendant did so intentionally, knowing that he 
was not entitled to it; and (3) the bank's deposits were insured by the 
FDIC. Dist. Ct. Op. at 2. 
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verdict winner, there are no facts from which we could infer 
that the memo notations had anything to do with the 
bank's decision to pay, let alone that it relied on them and 
was deceived. 
 
Accordingly, we will REVERSE the judgment of the 
District Court. 
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STAPLETON, J., Concurring: 
 
As the Court's opinion recounts, the scope of 18 U.S.C. 
S 2113(b) has been extended beyond common law larceny, 
i.e., the taking of property from the possession of a covered 
institution without its consent, to situations involving the 
taking of property from the possession of such an 
institution when its consent has been obtained thr ough 
false pretenses. So far as I am aware, however, it has never 
been applied to a case involving the taking of pr operty from 
the possession of a consenting covered institution when its 
consent has not been obtained by false pretenses. Our 
decision in United States v. Pinto, 646 F .2d 833 (3d Cir. 
1981), seems to me to preclude our extending the scope of 
the statute to include such a case, and I concur in the 
judgment of the Court on that basis. 
 
Here, Howerter practiced no deception on the bank; the 
checks were paid because the bank was obligated to honor 
his signature. While the government attempts to make 
much of the fact that some checks contained memos 
suggesting the future use of the withdrawn funds for 
scholarships and a senior class party, the bank's obligation 
to honor the checks signed by Howerter was the same 
whether or not they contained such notations. That those 
notations were wholly unrelated to the bank's consent to 
the withdrawals is evidenced by the fact that it honored all 
of the checks promptly on presentation. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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